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This chapter assesses the varying 
degrees to which young women 
in Arab countries are empow-
ered or disempowered, included 
or excluded. Setting aside the 
stereotypes of subordination, 
it presents a nuanced picture 
of the changing circumstanc-
es of young women today, the 
struggle against injustice and 
the triumphs over injustice. 
The chapter shows how a new 
generation of young feminists 
is challenging the considerable 
barriers creatively and with de-
termination.
in the eligibility for citizenship through marriage 
or through the birth of children. In 13 Arab coun-
tries, laws do not allow foreign spouses to gain 
citizenship through marriage to women who are 
citizens, and, in 10 countries, citizenship cannot 
be assigned to children through mothers only.4 
In some countries, children can gain citizenship 
through their mothers only in certain cases, for 
example if the father is unknown or has died or 
if there has been an irrevocable divorce. Women 
can apply for passports without the permission of 
their husbands or guardians in only 12 countries.5 
Many countries require women who are travelling 
to be accompanied by male guardians.6 
Although family laws differ, they tend to en-
shrine gender inequality by limiting women’s right 
to marry, divorce, obtain child custody and inherit. 
Family law or personal status codes remain a core 
source of symbolic and material inequality.7 Per-
sonal status codes embody a patriarchal bias that 
is legitimized by religious institutions and are thus 
difficult to challenge. The legal basis of the codes 
in most Arab countries is Muslim Fiqh (jurispru-
dence), which is supposed to reflect Sharia Law, 
but, in reality, reflects patriarchal interpretations 
of Sharia Law. Personal status codes largely codify 
women’s status in terms of male guardianship 
and authority. This framing of gender relations 
can sanction domestic violence, as a husband’s 
violence towards his wife can be considered a 
form of ta’dib (correction or discipline). In some 
countries, family law conflates rape with adultery 
or premarital sex so that, if a woman cannot prove 
rape, she is liable to be tried for zina (fornication).
The past decade has witnessed some 
improvement in the legal rights of women. In 
Morocco and Tunisia, personal status codes 
have been amended to support more egalitarian 
gender relations, and progressive amendments 
to laws and codes have been passed recently in 








Various barriers restrict the freedoms of women in 
areas such as law, politics, education and employ-
ment in several countries, where discrimination 
often occurs in an environment of socially tolerat-
ed violence. However, across and within the Arab 
countries, the reach of injustice can vary sharply.
Legal barriers to equality
Young women across the region face legal barriers 
to gender equality. Among the Arab countries, the 
constitutions of 15 explicitly recognize equality 
between men and women before the law or feature 
anti-discrimination clauses.2 Among the Arab states, 
all but Somalia and Sudan have signed and ratified 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. However, Arab 
signatories have entered so many reservations 
to the Convention that they have undermined 
its significance in the region. Indeed, despite the 
constitutional recognition of equality, most Arab 
countries have no laws that directly ban gender 
discrimination. Further, while several constitutions 
explicitly refer to the state’s commitment to protect 
women against all forms of violence, the commitment 
is often undone by the penal code, which is usually 
indulgent towards male perpetrators of crimes of 
violence against women, notably spousal violence, 
rape and so-called honour crimes.3 
Laws on citizenship rights are important for their 
symbolic and practical significance: they offer 
insight into the link between gender norms and 
the construction of national identity. Most laws 
show glaring differences between men and women 
“ My resignation is a warning to the government and a protest against 
its inability to evaluate the needs of 
women.  ”
Nawal Al-Samaraie, tendering her resignation as 
Minister of Women’s Affairs, Iraq1 
general recommendations for the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women.11
Women’s presence in parliament does not 
necessarily signify an improved situation in 
the political realm, nor has it necessarily con-
tributed to gains in political rights or women’s 
rights in general. Numerical increases belie the 
complexities and conditions of women’s entry 
into formal politics. In some places, the intro-
duction of quotas has simply led to nepotism 
so that women relatives of sitting politicians 
are appointed. Women continue to suffer from 
unequal treatment and condescending attitudes. 
Women politicians do not yet enjoy the deci-
sion-making power of their male counterparts. 
In Iraq, for example, no women took part in ne-
gotiations to reach a compromise government 
after the parliamentary elections of 2010, and 
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs is only a state’s 
cabinet with no allocated budget.
Similarly, the inclusion of women in deci-
sion-making positions does not always lead 
to fresh measures to advance equality. Re-
searchers and activists in Iraq and Palestine, 
for example, have observed that quotas have 
enabled women in conservative religious parties 
to enter parliament, where they often support 
laws and regulations that undermine women’s 
rights.12 
status codes are a grim indicator of the extent of 
gender discrimination, they do not necessarily 
reflect the realities of gender relations or the 
gains that women are making by manoeuvring 
within the system, and some are challenging 
the laws and codes by proposing alternative 
religious readings and their own visions of 
equality.
Representation in formal politics
Limited improvements have been made in the past 
decade on women’s electoral rights and political 
representation.8 Globally, women account for 22.2 
percent of national parliamentarians; the share in 
the Arab region was only 18.1 percent in 2014.9 The 
share of seats held by women in parliamentary 
bodies across the region was below 4 percent in 
seven countries: Qatar (0 percent), Yemen (0.3 
percent), Oman (1.2 percent), Kuwait (1.5 percent), 
Egypt (2.0 percent in 2012), Comoros (3.0 percent) 
and Lebanon (3.1 percent) (annex  2 table A.9).10 
Quota systems in countries such as Iraq, 
Jordan and Palestine ensure the presence of 
women in representative assemblies from mu-
nicipalities to parliament. After introducing a 
quota in 2012, Algeria became the first Arab 
country to surpass the 30 percent target for 
the parliamentary representation of women put 
forward in the Beijing Platform for Action and the 
Figure 4.1  Female and male educational attainment in the Arab region, 1970–2013
Source: World Bank 2015b.
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while, for male children, the corresponding numbers 
ranged from around 2,200 in Oman and Qatar to 
351,750 in Yemen. In some countries, particularly 
those in the GCC, young women’s participation 
in education is rapidly outpacing men’s.16 Qatar 
and the United Arab Emirates have the highest 
female-to-male university enrollment ratios in 
the world. Even among extremely conservative 
families, young women’s educational achievement 
is often encouraged and prized.
In situations of conflict or poverty, young 
women’s educational opportunities are greatly 
reduced. The access to education among young 
women is less in rural and nomadic communities 
than in urban areas, owing, in some cases, to 
transport difficulties.17 Poverty, conflict and rural 
residence often have a similar effect on young 
men’s education. However, among women, these 
factors tend to intersect negatively with the 
characteristics of women’s gender experience, 
such as the high prevalence of early marriage 
in Yemen or young women’s burdensome care-
giving roles when families are disrupted by 
war, as in Iraq and Syria. Among those women 
who have access to education, school quality 
Education
Young women’s access to education has been 
improving, as most Arab countries have provided 
access to public and free education for most 
girls and boys (figure 4.1). Except for tertiary 
education, educational attainment among women 
has been expanding since 1970. Enrollment in 
primary education in developing regions reached 
90 percent in 2010, up from 82 percent in 1999.13 
In 2013, net enrollment among girls in primary 
education reached nearly 83 percent in the re-
gion, against a world average of 88.3 percent. 
The ratio of female-to-male primary enrollment 
in the region was 96 percent in 2013, against 
98.3 percent worldwide.14 Literacy rates among 
adults and youth are rising, and gender gaps 
are narrowing. In 1990, there were 90 literate 
young women for every 100 literate young men; 
by 2010, the ratio had narrowed to 95 women 
for every 100 men.15
The access of young people to education varies by 
country. In 2011, the number of female children of 
primary school age who were out of school ranged 
from 2,500 in Qatar and Syria to 597,200 in Yemen, 
Box 4.1  Aseel Alawadhi: Cancellation of the discriminatory admission policy at Kuwait University
On 25 March 2012, the Administrative Court of 
Kuwait pronounced a judgement in favour of a 
female student at Kuwait University that was 
the first of its kind in the country. The judge-
ment was followed, on 6 June that year, by three 
similar rulings for the benefit of other students. 
The judgements prevented the university from 
refusing to accept women students to certain 
departments based solely on the university’s 
admission policy.
A group of women students had filed lawsuits 
against the university for rejecting their appli-
cations to the Department of Medicine even 
though they had scored higher averages than 
male students who were accepted. The female 
students had graduated with honours from high 
school and had finished the first academic year at 
the Center of Medical Sciences with distinction.
Kuwait University had for many years followed 
an acceptance policy in certain departments, 
including medicine, distinguishing between men 
and women students. Men students were accept-
ed with lower averages than women students.
The court affirmed that the principle of equal-
ity is among the general constitutional principles 
on which the rule of law is based. It indicated 
that equality, intrinsically, is equal treatment 
between people in similar situations or positions 
and unequal treatment between people in dif-
ferent situations or positions. In the opinion of 
the court, the defendant—the university admin-
istrative body—had set the minimum average for 
acceptance by the Department of Medicine at 
2,080 for Kuwaiti males and 3,020 for Kuwaiti 
females, although the two groups were in the 
same legal position of having passed the foun-
dation year at the Center of Medical Sciences. 
Considering this to be in violation of the principle 
of equality stipulated in Article 29 of the Con-
stitution, the court voided the acceptance policy 
based on gender discrimination.
Note: Aseel Alawadhi is visiting researcher, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 
assistant professor, Kuwait University and former member of Parliament.
The share of women who work outside the home 
has risen in all Arab countries in recent years, 
but especially where women have benefited from 
government policies that seek to nationalize the 
labour force and lower unemployment. Women 
are working mainly in the public sector. In Jordan, 
for example, 82 percent of women’s positions are 
in the public sector.
Employed women face challenges in the region 
that are similar to those encountered elsewhere. 
They are often paid less than men for the same 
jobs, must carry the double burden of employment 
and domestic work, and must often struggle to 
be taken seriously or to acquire decision-making 
positions in the workplace. Many young women 
must also face prejudice and harassment at work. 
No Arab country has legislation prohibiting sexual 
harassment in the workplace. Young women in 
Arab countries, like all women, face discrimina-
tion in laws on pensions and benefits because 
men are considered the household breadwinners.
Statistics at a global level show that the higher 
the rate of gender equality, the more women 
have access to economic opportunities, that is, 
the more women are financially independent. In 
Arab countries, the high rates of gender inequality 
coincide with a lack of economic opportunities 
among women (figure 4.2).
is sometimes an issue. For instance, young 
women’s concentration in disciplines typically 
reserved almost exclusively for women, such 
as care-giving and certain services, can narrow 
women’s future opportunities by excluding them 
from better paying employment in supposedly 
male professional preserves (box 4.1).
Employment
In the past 30 years, the global economic situation 
has been marked by two interrelated phenome-
na that have contributed to the feminization of 
poverty.18 First is the transition from state-led 
development to neoliberal economics, which has 
been accompanied by an international division 
of labour that is reliant on cheap female labour. 
Second is the emergence of temporary, part-time, 
casual home-based jobs, alongside the decline 
of the welfare state in developing countries.19 
Privatization and restructuring have in many 
places—notably Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia—led 
to layoffs that have affected women relatively 
more than men. Thus, like their peers elsewhere, 
young women in Arab countries must toil dis-
proportionately to find meaningful, fulfilling and 
properly remunerated employment, especially 
in their first jobs after university.
Source: UNDP 2013; Women’s Economic Opportunity Index (WEOI); regional calculations based on EIU data 2012.
Note: The Gender Inequality Index (GII) is rated on a 0–1 scale, where a higher score indicates a more pro-gender stance. Here, 
GII scores are multiplied by 100 for ease of comparison. The WEOI is rated on a 0–100 scale, whereby higher values indicate 
better economic opportunities.
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Box 4.2  Hibaaq Osman: Girls in conflict
The instability and breakdown in law and order 
that accompany conflict make girls and young 
women particularly vulnerable to gender-based 
violence. The failure to protect them exposes 
an entire generation to damage, thwarting their 
dreams and pushing them to rethink their future.
In March 2015, the Office of the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Human Rights 
reported that Da’esh subjected Yezidi women 
in Iraq to sexual violence that may amount to 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, and 
that “the promise of sexual access to women 
and girls has been used in ISIL propaganda 
materials as part of its recruitment strategy”.1 
Girls as young as 6 years of age were raped by 
captors who viewed them as “spoils of war”.2 
They were “inspected . . . to evaluate their 
beauty” before being enslaved or traded and 
sold to fighters.3 
According to UNICEF, sexual violence in conflict 
is “unbearably common”.4 Such atrocities are 
perhaps the most acute example of the traumas 
faced by girls and young women in conflict 
settings, but there are also chronic risks that 
are equally significant. Fleeing conflict does 
not mean young women are safe; displacement 
still leaves them at great risk of gender-based 
violence, including rape and forced marriage. UN 
Women finds that many of the gender-specific 
problems displaced young Syrian women and 
girls encounter stem from cultural values that 
prevent them from leaving the home unes-
corted. This has a devastating impact on their 
ability to access basic and specialized services 
in the midst of a humanitarian crisis, when the 
cumulative nature of such obstacles has even 
greater impact. UNICEF finds that the share of 
Syrian refugee child brides in Jordan increased 
from 12 percent in 2011 to 32 percent in the 
first quarter of 2014. Syrian child brides were 
also significantly more likely than counter-
parts in the Iraqi, Jordanian and Palestinian 
communities to marry men 15 or more years 
older than them. Access to physical and mental 
health treatment from such trauma in times of 
conflict is severely limited, while the stigma 
around sexual violence in the Syrian refugee 
community makes it a taboo subject among 
victims, potentially preventing them from re-
porting incidents or seeking treatment. Such 
stigma can make access to justice a particular 
problem in the region.
UNDP has determined that women who 
are victims of gender-based violence in Libya 
tend to avoid formal, tribal and traditional 
justice systems, primarily for fear of being 
“publically shamed or blamed for the crime”.5 
This and the “lack of confidentiality, specialized 
staff, and physical reporting outlets” mean 
that gender-based violence is underreported 
and widespread, creating additional barriers 
to agencies seeking to address the problem, 
assess its scale and respond appropriately.6 In 
Yemen, before the latest conflict, literacy rates 
among girls of primary-school age were only 
74 percent compared with 96 percent among 
boys. If young women are to participate fully 
in the country’s future, then too many have 
already been excluded through lack of edu-
cational opportunity. Because of the ongoing 
conflict, youth displaced by violence now face 
huge disruptions in their education, and many 
will encounter barriers that will prevent them 
from returning to their studies.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1325 provides an important framework to un-
derstand what needs to be done to help young 
women at times of war and in pre- and post-war 
scenarios. However, the resolution itself has not 
prevented these atrocities. The recommendations 
of women leaders in the region, led by Karama, 
underscore that international organizations 
involved in peace processes, such as the United 
Nations and the League of Arab States, must 
make such processes inclusive, ensuring that 
women are adequately represented in at least 
30 percent of decision making positions. The 
women, peace and security agenda should also 
be given some teeth through the establishment 
of a mechanism whereby member states can 
be held accountable if they fail to implement 
resolution 1325 and related resolutions.
Note: Hibaaq Osman is founder and chief executive officer of Karama, http://www.el-karama.org/.
1. UN News Centre 2015.
2. UNHRC 2015, p. 9.
3. UNHRC 2015, p. 9.
4. UNICEF n.d.
5. UNDP 2015, p. 4.
6. UNDP 2015, p. 5.
The effects of social and political conservatism
Conservative social and political forces form a rigid, 
insidious alliance against the empowerment of young 
women in Arab countries. Their gender discourses 
are not new in the region, but are now flourishing in 
unstable times. Their dissemination across borders 
is being fuelled by new media technologies. Whether 
religious or secular, they tend to involve a rejection 
of Westernization and the promotion of an authentic 
national or regional and often religious culture. As these 
forces expand their political power base, they more 
closely police women’s movements, behaviour and 
dress and constrict women’s choices. Conservative 
Islamic parties promote a normative and discriminatory 
gender ideology, treat women as legal minors and 
insist that women’s bodies must be fully covered.
The patriarchal society is repressive of young women 
for reasons of both gender and age because it favours 
not only men, but also maturity and seniority.25 Because 
of their use of social media, young women tend to 
be more globally well connected than older women, 
but this can lead them to be accused of turning away 
from the generation of their parents and becoming too 
Western. Changing fashions in clothing are common 
in global youth culture, but, in societies in which older 
women observe strict dress codes, such changes vis-
ibly separate young women and help target them for 
disapproval. Young women’s demographic position in 
a large youth population that is postponing marriage 







The Arab family is undergoing significant changes 
in many countries. In recent decades, patriarchy and 
family realities have encountered contradictions 
Gender-based violence
Gender-based violence affects women across the 
region. Some forms—such as “honour killings” 
and female genital mutilation (FGM)—affect 
young women particularly. The so-called hon-
our killings or femicide affect young women at 
higher rates than older women. In Jordan, for 
example, 81 percent of victims are under 30, 
and the largest subcategory of victims is aged 
19–24.20 The dangerous practice of FGM relates 
particularly to young women. Although usually 
carried out during childhood, it is entwined with 
ideas of sexual propriety and marriage prospects, 
which affect young women especially. Some 
Arab countries have set laws on gender-based 
violence, such as the 2014 law against domestic 
violence in Lebanon and the 2008 law on the 
protection against marital violence in Jordan. 
Draft laws on gender-based violence also exist 
in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, as well 
as sexual harassment laws in Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia.21 But these laws have 
yet to be passed, let alone enforced. Physical 
abuse is generally prohibited by law, but none of 
the Arab countries explicitly recognizes marital 
rape as a crime, and special protection against 
domestic violence is rare. Although repealed 
in Morocco in 2014, laws that allow rapists to 
escape punishment if they marry their victim 
remain on the books in various Arab countries, 
as in other parts of the world.22 
All these forms of violence are associated with 
deprivation, poverty and personal insecurity. Pov-
erty and rural residence usually correlate with 
FGM.23 Similarly, among the victims of the so-
called honour crimes, most are not only young, 
but also from impoverished families. A study 
in Jordan reveals a strong correlation between 
poverty and “honour crimes” among both victims 
and perpetrators.24 The physical and economic 
insecurity caused by conflict can be a lead de-
terminant in earlier or less-favourable marriages 
for young women (see chapter 6). Young women 
in conflict situations suffer from higher rates of 
gender-based violence. Such rates are usually 
even higher if the women also belong to a minori-
ty or marginalized group. No stratum of society 
is immune to gender-based violence; however, 
the ability to seek judicial redress or medical 
treatment or the opportunity to seek services 
to escape from gender-based violence depend 
heavily on a woman’s social standing and access 
to economic resources (box 4.2). 
The greater educational attainment of young 
women is one of the main factors explaining the 
changes in the age of marriage. To pursue their 
studies, many educated young women are choos-
ing to delay marriage until after graduation. Even 
in the oil-rich countries known for their conserva-
tive gender norms, the rise in the share of young, 
unmarried women is apparent; the average age 
of women’s marriage in Qatar and United Arab 
Emirates is 25, but 20 in Saudi Arabia (annex 2 
table A.10). The general trend towards delayed 
marriage is also closely related to the econom-
ic crisis and the high levels of unemployment, 
particularly unemployment among young men 
because men tend to bear the financial burden of 
marriage. Establishing a home for a new family 
is becoming increasingly difficult in the current 
economic climate.29 
and challenges linked to economic development, 
demographic transitions, legal reform and women’s 
increasing educational attainment.26 Declining fer-
tility rates, changes in the structure of the family, 
widespread activism over women’s rights and a 
conservative backlash are all signs of the ques-
tioning of patriarchy.27 
Yet, marriage remains an integral institution in 
Arab societies. As in most countries, government 
institutions and laws enshrine marriage and rein-
force its centrality to the social fabric. Nonetheless, 
the emergence of a new social group, the singles, is 
an important feature of the changes in the family. 
The mean age at first marriage among women 
has risen: 50 years ago it was around 18; now it is 
around 25 (annex 2 table A.10). The highest mean 
is in Libya (31), while Iraq, Palestine and Saudi Ara-
bia are at the other end of the range (20).28 


















In million % change Any 
method
Modern 
methodCountries 2014 2025 2014–2025
Egypt 21.3 25.2 18.2 53 2.7 60 58 490
Iraq 8.6 11.7 35.6 53 3.91 51 33 310
Jordan 2.0 2.2 11.2 36 3.12 59 42 470
Lebanon 1.4 1.4 -5.4 19 1.49 58 34 2,100
Libya 1.8 2.0 10.9 15 2.26 42 20 620
Morocco 9.2 9.5 2.6 37 2.71 67 57 400
Palestinea 2.4 3.4 43.3 40 6.36 53 40 330
Somalia 1.1 1.5 33.5 60 3.88 15 1 16
Sudanb 9.4 12.6 33.4 58 4.28 9 6 31
Syria 5.6 7.5 34.0 42 2.88 47 33 460
Tunisia 3.1 3.1 0.7 14 1.97 63 53 860
Yemen 6.3 8.5 35.8 57 3.83 23 13 90
Regional totalc 95.9 114.4 19.3 41 3.23 46 40 …
Source: UN DESA 2009, 2013c, 2014; Haub and Caneda 2011; WHO 2012; Iraq Central Organization for Statistics & Information 
Technology and Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office 2007; PAPFAM 2014.
Note: … = Data are not available. The total fertility rate is the average number of children a woman would have if current age-spe-
cific fertility rates remained constant throughout her childbearing years. Any method includes modern and traditional methods. 
Traditional methods include periodic abstinence, withdrawal, prolonged breastfeeding and folk methods. Modern methods include 
sterilization, IUD, the pill, injectable, implant, condom, foam/jelly and diaphragm.
a. Data for Palestine refer to the Arab population of Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
b. Population data refer to what is today Sudan (estimated at 80 percent of the total population of South Sudan and Sudan); other 
data refer to South Sudan and Sudan (that is, pre-partition).
c. Regional total includes all 22 members of the League of Arab States; those not shown are Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Kuwait, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
Table 4.1  Population and reproductive health indicators for selected Arab countries
pregnancies are very common, especially in poorer 
countries such as Sudan, Somalia and Yemen. 
These three countries have the lowest contra-
ceptive use (i.e., percentage of married women 
ages 15–49 using contraception) and account 
for 77 percent of maternal deaths in the region.37
Data on unwanted pregnancies, abortions, 
sexually transmitted infections and HIV/AIDs 
are difficult to obtain.38 Young women’s sexual-
ity and childbearing before or outside marriage 
are generally taboo. The stigma is reflected in 
how governments approach children born out of 
wedlock. In some countries, unmarried mothers 
cannot register their babies, and the children 
of unmarried parents have limited nationality 
rights. The actual choices and coping strate-
gies of young women who become pregnant 
vary greatly depending on their social and legal 
environment.
Lack of information and access to health care 
services among poor and uneducated women are 
the main factors in many unwanted pregnancies. 
In Morocco, of the 78 percent of married women 
who would prefer to avoid a pregnancy, 67 percent 
use contraceptives, and 11 percent do not. These 
11 percent have no access to contraception, an 
unmet need, which is usually more prevalent in 
the poorest wealth quintiles and among women 
with less education (annex 2 table A.12).39 
One particularly harmful consequence of unin-
tended pregnancy is unsafe abortion, especially 
where women face legal barriers to obtaining 
a safe abortion, that is, in most Arab countries. 
Abortion is illegal except to save a woman’s life 
in 13 Arab countries, and abortion is legal to save 
a woman’s life or preserve her physical and men-
tal health in eight.40 Only in Tunisia is abortion 
legally available without restriction.41 According 
to the World Health Organization (WHO), in the 
six countries of North Africa alone, nearly 1 million 
unsafe abortions were performed in 2008.42 Com-
plications from these abortions accounted for 12 
percent of maternal deaths in the subregion. The 
unavailability of legal abortion puts the weight of 
the state behind the existing dissonance between 
later marriage and the taboo on premarital sexual 
activity. The disconnect is especially notable in 
countries such as Lebanon and Libya, where the 
highest marriage ages combine with the strictest 
positions on abortion.
In the countries where abortion is illegal, 
seeking one is likely to result in different outcomes 
depending on who the women are and where they 
live. Indeed, a young woman’s socioeconomic 
In most poorer and more rural economies, the 
age at first marriage has not risen as much as 
elsewhere.30 Mean-based comparisons of this in-
dicator in rural and urban settings within countries 
produce surprisingly small discrepancies. Howev-
er, studies specifically measuring early marriage 
(under age 18) reveal that such marriages tend 
to take place in rural and impoverished settings; 
conflict and lack of education are also strong de-
terminants.31 
The legal marriage age is still below 18 years 
in nearly half the countries in the region (annex 
2 table A.11). Moreover, in most countries, a 
woman needs a waly (male guardian) to marry, 
that is, women are not allowed to marry without 
the authorization of their father, elder brothers, 
or uncles. Activism for women’s rights has made 
some encouraging advances. Morocco’s reformed 
Mudawana (family law) in 2004 set the minimum 
age of marriage among both men and women at 
18 years.32 Jordan’s campaign on the issue of mar-
riage age and the reform of the Jordanian family 
law of 2010 also aimed to raise the marriage age 
among young women. (Nonetheless, in Jordan, 
the law still provides judges with the right to 
evaluate special cases and rule accordingly. The 
special cases are not defined in the law, and, so, 
the paradoxical effect of the reform is that a girl 
can be married at any age).33 
Reproductive rights and marriage as a norm
The sexual and reproductive health of young 
men and women is characterized by a lack of 
access to information; sex education curricula are 
rare. Health service providers seldom recognize 
the need of youth for knowledge in this area of 
health or make youth welcome, particularly if 
they are not married. Apart from Tunisia, which 
undertook the most serious effort to establish a 
national programme to address young people’s 
sexual and reproductive health, such services 
are limited (Egypt, Morocco and Palestine) or 
non-existent in most Arab countries.34 
Precarious forms of marriage are also reported, 
such as temporary marriages practised under 
different names. The few studies carried out on 
these forms of marriage show that they favour 
men and that women are denied most marital 
rights.35 
Four married women of reproductive age in 
10 in Arab countries use modern contraception, 
in contrast with six women in the developing 
regions as well as globally (table 4.1).36 Unwanted 
Negotiating waithood in the parental home
The social and legal treatment of women as de-
pendent individuals within the family as daugh-
ters, sisters and then wives produces frictions, 
especially among unmarried young women whose 
freedoms are constrained by family members as 
they grow older and continue to live in the parental 
home. Social and economic norms that cast men 
as breadwinners and women as caregivers shape 
how young women find marriage partners even 
if the realities are somewhat different for other 
reasons. The idea that higher education is inap-
propriate for women, especially if the education 
would require women to live far from home, is an 
obstacle in some settings, mainly in lower class 
and suburban areas.
standing can be as important as whether abortion 
is legal. Within each country, the level of service 
provision and class and wealth add an element of 
differentiation in the choices available to unmarried 
women. A middle-class woman living in a city where 
illegal abortion medication is easily purchased may 
have more choice than an impoverished woman 
in a rural environment where abortion is legal, 
but services are geographically and financially 
inaccessible. While young women seeking to 
terminate pregnancy in Cairo are likely to seek 
out drugs that are relatively easy to acquire and 
safe to use, women in rural areas are likely to rely 
on other means. In one rural area in Upper Egypt, 
92 percent of women who had had an abortion 
sought the services of a friend, neighbour, or 
traditional midwife to carry out the procedures.43 
Box 4.3  Islamic feminism across borders: the Musawah Movement
Musawah (equality) is a global movement for 
equality and justice in the Muslim family. It was 
launched in February 2009 at a global meeting 
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and initiated by the 
Malaysian Muslim feminist group Sisters in Islam. 
The movement was a transnational response to 
the equally transnational problem of the use of 
Islam to resist women’s demands for equality. 
Musawah comprises NGOs, activists, scholars, 
legal practitioners and policymakers across the 
globe and approaches gender equality in the Mus-
lim family along three axes: knowledge-building, 
capacity-building and international advocacy.
Focusing on progressive and feminist in-
terpretations of Islamic texts to counter the 
male-centric interpretations of Islamic ortho-
doxy, Musawah highlights the efforts of women 
to reclaim their right to shape the religious inter-
pretations, norms and laws that affect their lives. 
Musawah starts from the premise that equali-
ty is a founding principle of Islam, and gender 
equality is therefore in line with Islam, rather 
than opposed to it. The movement rejects abso-
lutist religious understandings, and it critiques 
both the way Islam is used as a political ideology 
and the discrimination against women and the 
violations of fundamental liberties that often 
stem from this use. The approach also criticizes 
notions of feminism—necessarily imported—that 
have a Western or anti-religious bias.
Musawah has produced a working document, 
the Framework for Action, which advocates for 
initiatives based on Islamic sources, internation-
al human rights, national laws, constitutional 
guarantees and the lived realities of women and 
men and calls for reforms in law and practice. 
The framework offers the possibility that these 
various approaches can be in harmony with each 
other and that women activists can choose how 
to emphasize these approaches in their advo-
cacy according to specific needs and contexts. 
The framework has been adopted by Muslim 
feminists across the world, including those in 
Arab nations, and has informed their strategies 
for change. It has been an important tool for 
countering the rising dominance of conserva-
tive interpretations of Islam and the use of these 
interpretations in politics.
The transnationalism of Musawah is a core 
of the movement. Bringing together Muslim 
women from across geographical borders has 
been important in building solidarity, and women 
across the world realize that they are not work-
ing in isolation, but that they are fighting similar 
battles. Musawah’s transnational ties represent 
a channel that is important to women activists in 
sharing information and strategy. Musawah has 
established an affinity group for young women 
advocates, the Young Women’s Caucus, in which 
some 30 Muslim women under age 35 are work-
ing on issues among young Muslim women and 
based on the Musawah framework.
Source: Report team.
political representation and gender-based violence 
and harassment. Because gender-specific injus-
tices are closely tied to wider forms of inequal-
ity and injustice, it is no surprise that, in much 
of the mobilization of women, gender-specific 
and broader issues are addressed together. This 
has been the case especially among the young 
women involved in the uprisings who have used 
the momentum of the protests and transitions and 
the climate of questioning authority to promote 
gender justice as an integral element of wider 
social justice. This was evident, for example, in 
the International Women’s Day gathering in Tahrir 
Square in 2011, where Egyptian women joined 
one another to ensure that women’s rights issues 
constituted essential claims within the broader 
issues being advocated, such as economic justice, 
freedom of expression and labour rights.
Some of the most powerful feminist mobiliza-
tions tackle gender-based violence and denounce 
the broader structural violence that underpins 
it. For example, a Palestinian feminist initiative, 
the Committee for Resisting Women’s Killing, 
has demanded the use of the term qatl al-nisa 
(femicide) so as to counter the legitimization and 
justification of these crimes and to respond to 
the reliance on the term “honour crime” by the 
Israeli authorities to promote the idea that such 
violence originates in Palestinian and Arab culture.
Women’s activism is diverse and stretches 
across the spectrum of traditional party-
based politics to lobbying, informal activism 
and alternative cultural initiatives. Historically, 
movements of women across Arab countries 
comprise different strands: liberal feminist, 
reformist, anti-imperialist, nationalist, Marxist, 
Islamic and Islamist. In a context where much 
of the population is sensitive to or supportive 
of Islamist-oriented political projects, Islamic 
feminist movements have emerged. Groups 
taking this approach concentrate on the radical 
transformation of Islamic jurisprudence or 
otherwise use Islamic arguments to challenge 
gender inequality (box 4.3). Examples include 
movements that focus on challenging male 
guardianship laws or that use religious texts to 
challenge domestic violence. Many women’s 
rights activists combine religious approaches 
with an international human rights framework, 
arguing that the two are compatible; an example 
is the transnational Musawah movement (box 
4.3). Other groups pragmatically shift their focus 
depending on the issue or the authority they 
are lobbying. Many initiatives across the region 
While certain freedoms during waithood are 
reduced, others are increased, such as the ability 
to pursue educational and social activities without 
the worry of supporting oneself financially. The 
family is also a key source of emotional and social 
support for many young women. This can be es-
pecially important for young women in migrant or 
minority groups who experience oppression along 
lines other than gender. In this case, the family 
may represent a haven from discrimination in 
the outside world. The often violent conditions 
under the Israeli occupation have bolstered a Pal-
estinian (neo-)patriarchy that is highly deleteri-
ous to women.44 However, a study of Palestinian 
women’s birthing experiences in Occupied East 
Jerusalem shows that husbands and family mem-
bers are the most important support for young 
women in difficult times.45 Embattled situations 
can strengthen patriarchal society, while also 
strengthening young women’s reliance on and 







From feminism to social justice
The political and social mobilization of young 
women was a conspicuous feature of the recent 
popular uprisings across the region. Young women 
not only participated in these protests, but many 
also took the lead in organizing them. Campaigns 
and activism have focused primarily on women’s 
rights and gender equality, addressing issues as 
diverse as legal rights (reforms of the personal 
status codes and the penal and labour codes), 
and a lack of independence from the ruling polit-
ical class. The “NGO-ization”46of the women’s 
movement in the past two decades or so has also 
fostered suspicion of women’s mobilizations. 
The weighty presence of global funders has 
helped create a damaging view that feminist 
groups are “inauthentic” to local culture, or are 
“agents of the West”.   
Another major hindrance to women’s political 
organization is the undemocratic character of 
political regimes that suppress dissent and ban 
civil society organizations and public gatherings. 
Women’s groups often frame themselves as 
philanthropic or as community projects to avoid 
government interference. Another response is to 
seek refuge on the web to share information and 
mobilize (see below).
are pursuing a secular approach across a broad 
spectrum of political trends.
Obstacles to women’s mobilization
One obstacle faced by those mobilizing for gender 
equality is the suspicion that such groups are 
often met with.  One reason for such suspicion 
is the history of “state feminism” within the 
Arab countries.  State-building and modernizing 
efforts in many Arab countries in the 1970s and 
1980s led to policies pushing for women’s ed-
ucation and entry into the workplace alongside 
men.  Subsequently, in order to consolidate state 
power, women’s unions were incorporated into 
the ruling parties.  As such, feminism continues 
hold some associated with an authoritarian past, 
Box 4.4  An inclusive space: Egypt’s Imprint Movement
The Imprint Movement is a voluntary social or-
ganization founded by a group of young women 
and men in Cairo in July 2012 to confront a range 
of social issues in Egypt, from illiteracy to the 
plight of street children. It was founded in the 
context of post-revolution Egypt. Through the 
revolution, many young people became aware 
of the oppressive conditions experienced by 
Egyptians, especially by Egyptian women. This 
awareness amplified the voices of the women 
who were speaking out for social justice and re-
fusing to accept gender inequality. These voices 
were crucial because they broke the silent as-
sumption that sexual harassment is an accepted 
element of Egyptian society. Nonetheless, a year 
after the beginning of the Egyptian revolution, 
many young people were still struggling to find 
a way to make their voices audible. The Imprint 
Movement sought to create a safe space that 
was not divided by political rifts, where people 
from different backgrounds could work side by 
side to improve society.
Against this backdrop grew the movement’s 
first project, on sexual harassment. The project’s 
co-founders, having witnessed an increase of 
oppression and violence against women during 
the upheaval, started the project in a belief in 
justice and security for all. The project is based 
on two fundamental principles: nonviolence and 
the power of dialogue. It completely rejects the 
use of physical or verbal violence to combat 
harassment, believing that the only way to 
end harassment—itself a phenomenon of vi-
olence—is through respectful dialogue. While 
the emphasis is on learning practical strategies 
by taking part in the project, Imprint members 
learn about the power structures that lie be-
hind the phenomenon of sexual harassment, 
including patriarchy.
In addressing the problem of sexual harass-
ment, the movement agreed on the importance 
of including men in its work, which came natu-
rally as two of Imprint’s co-founders are men. 
During Egypt’s major holidays, when harass-
ment is typically at its worst, Imprint organiz-
es patrols in public spaces, made up of young 
male volunteers who intervene non-violently 
to prevent incidents of harassment, to deliver 
harassers to the police, and to help in filing legal 
claims against harassers. The patrols also act to 
promote positive examples of masculinity. They 
show that there is an alternative, that joining 
the movement against harassment is cool. The 
sight of men commanding respect without using 
violence or harassing women is as a powerful 
tool for change.
Imprint functions at the grassroots level and 
through advocacy, transmitting voices from the 
streets to the government through online media 
and through face-to-face meetings with offi-
cials. The movement relies on teams that work 
at various levels and aim at different targets, 
though all have the overarching aim of fighting 
sexual harassment.
Source: Report team with input from Nihal Saad Zaghloul, co-founder of Imprint.
landscape of activism. The mobilization of women 
in street demonstrations, informal gatherings and 
online were often characterized by an overarching 
framework of dignity, which transcended differ-
ences among religious and political positions. This 
feature has been adopted and incorporated into 
many of the gender-focused groups that have 
been formed since the uprisings, such as the 
Cairo-based Harakat Basma (imprint movement) 
(box 4.4).
New research underlines that various politi-
cal streams have begun to coalesce under the 
banner of women’s rights. Research conducted 
on the February 20 Movement in Morocco and 
mobilizations focusing on the Moroccan family 
code that hinged on the debate between equality 
and the complementarity of the sexes represent 
instances in which feminism not only penetrated 
the social imagery of a new generation of activists, 
but also in which many of the young women who 
are mobilizing for equality are not anti-Islamist or 
anti-religious.49 According to many participants 
in the pro-equality demonstrations, this new 
generation has a much broader base and is will-
ing to advocate for women’s rights and gender 
equality, regardless of the different religious and 
political views of its members.
Research on women’s rights in Egypt highlights 
that various initiatives have drawn together young 
and older activists from diverse backgrounds and 
span different discourses ranging from human 
rights to Islamic feminism.50 
Another feature of contemporary feminists 
in Arab countries is their willingness to broach 
new and potentially sensitive topics such as 
gender norms, sexual choices and the politics 
of the body. Previously, only a few well-known 
intellectuals such as Nawal al-Sa’dawi and Fatima 
Mernissi were prepared to tackle such issues, 
which most activists felt lay beyond the pale 
of social, religious and cultural acceptability. 
But with topics such as sexual harassment, 
FGM and femicide now openly targeted in re-
cent feminist campaigns, an emerging group 
of young, urbanized and educated women’s 
rights activists is speaking to these issues 
more directly.
A common pattern is that women’s rights 
activists are sidelined by broader movements. 
The involvement of young women in uprisings 
and revolutions has not necessarily led to the 
inclusion of their demands in post-transition 
political landscapes. In the Iraqi Kurdish region, 
young women are often forced to choose between 
airing their gender concerns among mainstream 
feminist groups (which do not address their 
specific position as Kurds) or forgoing such con-
cerns so as to be included in the male-centric 
struggles for national liberation.47 The relegation 
of feminist demands was a feature of the ac-
tivism of young women in the recent uprisings. 
Thus, while the protests brought young men 
and women together in displays of solidarity 
with the struggles of women, young women can 
still be marginalized in male-dominated social 
movements, and many suffered abuse during 
the demonstrations.
A new political consciousness that transcends 
divisions
The massive participation of young women 
alongside men in the demonstrations, which 
included physical confrontation with security 
forces, has galvanized and altered political con-
sciousness in the region. Such involvement in 
new forms of protest and solidarity has inspired 
a new political image of women in which the 
wider public, as well as women themselves, 
recognize young women as important agents 
of change. Public perceptions were impacted 
most in cases where the involvement of women 
in protests represented a dramatic shift in 
their customary behaviour.48 Several feminist 
initiatives that have sprung up in the wake of 
the 2011 uprisings have been organized on the 
principles of participatory democracy, leading 
to grassroots entities characterized by less hi-
erarchy and bureaucracy. These initiatives are 
re-politicizing the NGO-dominated landscape 
of women’s rights and social justice.
The active involvement of women in the upris-
ings helped erode divisions within the women’s 
movement and build new alliances in the wider 
The variations in the experiences of young 
women in each Arab country, especially between 
rural and urban settings, are significant. Although 
no group in society is immune to gender-based vi-
olence, the violence is often associated with other 
social and structural deficiencies and tendencies 
towards marginalization. Among young women in 
poor rural areas, lack of access to contraception 
is likely to be compounded by lack of access to 
safe abortion to end unwanted pregnancies; in 
contrast, women in cities have a larger range of 
options. Economic conditions within rural areas 
also contribute to the greater prevalence of child 
marriages and gender-based violence, such as 
FGM.
Nonetheless, within cities, migrant status and 
race can dictate the obstacles women face. By 
virtue of her immigrant and indentured status, 
a migrant domestic worker in the GCC has little 
room to challenge the pervasive structures that 
affect her life. Meanwhile, well-educated, non-mi-
grant, urban-dwelling, middle-class young women 
might have more room to challenge oppressive 
norms and structures, whether by joining an 
organization addressing taboo topics or through 
routine choices about non-traditional lifestyles.
While culture and religion are often central 
to discussions of women in Arab countries, the 
impacts of political economy are often neglected. 
Concepts of culture, stigma and taboo are pres-
ent in young women’s lives, yet these concepts 
are one part of the picture, not the driving force 
in inequalities. The negotiations in which young 
women engage vis-à-vis marriage and the views of 
their immediate families, for example, are closely 
related to changing demographics and econom-
ic necessity. For women seeking entry into the 
workforce, the realities and opportunities of the 
labour market are as crucial as any cultural sanc-
tion against women working outside the home.
The problems facing young women in Arab 
countries are linked to the dominant neoliberal 
economic model of the last three decades, which 
has failed to produce jobs or decent livelihoods 
for many of the young. Indeed, the challenges 
facing young women in the Arab countries have 
many parallels with those facing women living 
in other parts of the global South and some in 
the global North. Culture and political economy 
are intertwined. While the former calls for public 
education, changes in attitudes and religious 
reform, the latter requires structural change 
without which it will not be possible for women 








Although the experiences of young women in 
Arab countries have much in common, they are 
greatly affected by different specificities in the 
various political, legal and economic contexts 
across countries. The plight of young women in 
Iraq, Palestine and Syria, for example, is inextri-
cably linked to the conflicts in those countries; 
war is leading to first-hand experiences of vio-
lence and displacement among young women 
that their counterparts living in relative peace do 
not face. Many women in the Gulf States, for ex-
ample, occupy a complex gendered space where 
wealth and economic privilege, at least among 
women who are citizens, rather than migrant 
workers, are confronted by rigid social codes and 
constraints. These women are free from want 
and may never experience the violence of war; 
yet, they live without an elementary freedom 
of movement, of expression and of association 
and may have few means to challenge violence 
in the home.
The struggle against authoritarianism may 
push women’s activism more deeply online, 
while women elsewhere in the world may have 
greater opportunities for offline action. The 
activism of young women varies according to 
the shape of the particular popular uprising 
or revolution in Arab countries. This diversity 
of experience across countries needs to be 
recognized. Failure to recognize it will favour 
ignorance of the complex roots, forms and 
outcomes of the fight of young women in Arab 
countries for their rights.
ation, young women are far from victims of cir-
cumstance.  Contrary to the mainstream global 
media depictions of women in Arab countries 
- which paint the latter as passive, oppressed, 
and voiceless – these women are negotiating and 
contesting systems of power in diverse, creative, 
and transformative ways. 
Young women in Arab countries are anything 
but passive victims.  Women in these countries, 
as in many other locations, are suffering due to 
instability and conflict, gender-based violence, 
exclusion and discrimination in work and educa-
tion.  These problems should not be downplayed. 
Nonetheless, despite and in reaction to this situ-
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